Corresponding author: Konstantin I. Kazenin (
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The paper discusses results of a qualitative study conducted in May-June 2021 in six regions of Russia (Astrakhan region, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Kalmykia, Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, Tomsk region and Yaroslavl region) with the purpose to identify opinions on impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on fertility. Focus groups were held in these regions among childless respondents aged below 35. This allowed to observe influence of the pandemic on intentions to become first-time parents which is critically important for fertility tendencies. Although the survey regions differed considerably by fertility rate and age-specific characteristics as well as by socio-cultural characteristics, key results of the focus groups were rather similar across regions. The respondents in all regions very strictly defined income levels necessary for having a child and also stressed out the need for parents to provide positive psychological conditions for their young off-springs. Assessing their abilities to become “high-quality” parents, the informants relied almost only on their own resources, not counting much upon assistance of elder relatives. Under these views, the pandemic was perceived as a serious obstacle for the “high-quality” parenthood. The informants did not expect the state measures of support for families with children to considerably soften this effect of the pandemic.
The general problem the paper discusses is the influence of the COVID pandemic upon fertility. Many studies suggest this influence in Russia and other countries, however its real scale and nature are currently yet to be discovered (see Section 2 for a brief overview of existing studies). Analysis of possible changes in fertility trends in the context of the COVID pandemic is of special interest because COVID-19 is the first global pandemic after dramatic fertility changes in the world in the 20th century (for example,
For Russia, official country-level statistics did not indicate any serious effect of the pandemic upon total fertility so far. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) remained stable at the levels of 1.49-1.50 children per woman in Russia in 2020-2021 with the decline to this level initiated and gradually progressing in previous years (for example,
Section 1 of the paper outlines possible effects of the pandemic upon fertility which are expected within the framework of the current demographic theory. Section 2 summarizes available data on changes in actual fertility and fertility intentions during the pandemic in different countries. Section 3 formulates the study objectives, while Section 4 outlines the study method. Section 5 presents main results, while Section 6 provides for their discussion.
Existing studies allow to distinguish at least two possible reasons for postponed childbearing or refusal of earlier plans to have a child during the pandemic.
First, in many studies it is argued that “external shocks” which have changed life conditions of individuals and households within a short time were regularly followed by decreased fertility. This was also observed at those historical stages when family planning methods were already commonly used and, therefore, decline in fertility was mainly induced by giving up fertility
Second, it has been demonstrated many times that economic uncertainty can be a factor decreasing fertility. According to majority of studies on fertility, labor market instability and high risks of unemployment are most often considered as the primary components of this uncertainty (for example, Comolli & Vignoli 2021;
Data on changes in fertility intentions and actual fertility in different countries during the pandemic are still rather fragmentary and preliminary. Without claiming to be a comprehensive review of available studies, we will present here only some results showing, on the one hand, the scale of the pandemic impact on fertility, and on the other hand, a rather complex, «nonlinear» nature of this influence. In most European countries and North America, the first wave of the pandemic (spring 2020) was followed by a serious decline in fertility manifested in the decreased number of births in November-December 2020 and January 2021 compared to the same months of the previous year (
Available studies on fertility intentions during the pandemic also focus on changes in intentions mainly during the first wave. Surveys and social network analyses have identified a strong tendency towards postponed births in countries with different levels of economic development and different socio-cultural characteristic, including some countries in Western and Southern Europe (
those facing especially hard financial consequences of the pandemic or having especially negative expectations about its consequences;
least-educated respondents (who could feel themselves especially vulnerable during the pandemic);
women of earlier reproductive age (aged under 30; this age group may have higher chances to fulfill their earlier fertility intentions in the future); and
those with a negative opinion about anti-COVID policy in their country.
Given the theoretical expectations and results of available studies on fertility intentions during the COVID-19 pandemic in other countries, the study aimed at covering the following questions in the context of Russia:
Is the pandemic an important factor for decision-making about childbearing? What is exactly the impact as viewed by potential parents?
What other factors are most crucial for respondents in terms of decision-making about childbearing during the pandemic?
Do respondents consider state policy measures on household support during the pandemic and pronatalist policy measures important for making decisions about childbearing?
We have attempted to answer these questions regarding childless men and women aged under 35. Focus on this age group was substantiated by the current age structure of fertility in Russia. Despite serious changes within the recent decades, the share of children born to mothers and fathers aged under 35 is still dominant, making reproductive intentions in these age groups crucial for fertility trends.
The fact that the survey is limited to childless respondents only was due to the following reasons. On the one hand, in general terms, it is natural to assume that becoming first-time parents suggests significant changes in the life of a couple, often more serious than birth of a subsequent child. Therefore, it can be expected that consequences of the pandemic for the first-child intentions could be especially serious. On the other hand, the mentioned about study on fertility intentions in Western and Southern Europe in the first months of the pandemic (
The focus group method proved to be prospective for studies on life strategies and plans of younger generations in Russia (see (
The focus group discussions were held according to one and the same guidelines in six regions of Russia in May-June 2021. In each region one focus group was held at the regional center and one or two interviews in a small town or rural area. Focus groups were held separately in regional centers in all regions. If only one focus group was held outside the regional center, it included both respondents residing in small town and rural area. In this case the rural or urban residence of each participant in the dialogue was identified. Most rural respondents came from relatively big settlements (with at least 1000 of population). This allowed to expect relatively small differences in their living conditions and that of respondents from small towns.
From 8 to 14 respondents took part in each focus group. Overall, 14 focus groups were held, the total number of participants equaled to 127. Men/women ratio, as well as proportions of respondents aged 18-24, 25-29 and 30-34 were nearly equal in most of the focus groups. Marital status was not controlled at the recruitment. In each group, the resulting proportion of married respondents or in civil union was not lower than 70%. Respondents with higher education accounted for up to 40% of participants in each focus-group. Ethnic composition of respondents correlated with ethnic composition of population at the territories where the survey was held.
We attempted to avoid recruiting respondents who had been acquainted with each other before the focus group. This was feasible in regional centers, while could be more problematic in small towns and rural areas. Spouses or partners never participated together in focus groups.
The following regions were selected for the survey: Astrakhan region, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Kalmykia, Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, Tomsk region, and Yaroslavl region. The selection was guided by the attempts to include region of the Russian Federation that considerably differed in first-birth levels and age characteristics. For example, the Astrakhan region was interesting as the one with the first-child Total Fertility Rate (TFR1) higher than the Russian average in 2020, with mother’s mean age at first birth (MAB1) lower than the country average (see Table
Thus, the regions selected for the study are diverse in terms of their first-child birth rates in previous years (see Table
It has to be emphasized here that our comparative cross-regional study did not aim to be representative for the country as a whole in any sense, rather than only documented similarities and differences in respondents’ opinions in the selected regions.
First-time births in the regions selected for the survey, 2020
|
|
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Tomsk region | 0.54 | 26.06 |
Republic of Kalmykia | 0.44 | 25.01 |
Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia | 0.50 | 25.86 |
Republic of Bashkortostan | 0.59 | 25.99 |
Astrakhan region | 0.64 | 24.82 |
Yaroslavl region | 0.59 | 26.35 |
Russian Federation | 0.62 | 25.96 |
It should be noted here that selection of particular regions for the survey among regions with similar fertility characteristics was guided by feasibility of conducting the survey in different regions rather than any formal procedure. Furthermore, it was hardly possible to take into account interregional differences in characteristics of the pandemic when selecting the regions, due to problems with data on COVID mortality in the Russian regions (
The focus-group guidelines included questions not only on the pandemic and fertility plans/intentions before and during it, but also general views on parenthood, ideal number of children etc.
It was generally not possible to discuss if and how these general views changed during the pandemic: respondents were more inclined to discuss their current perception of “high-quality” family life and parenthood regardless of time as well as pandemic-driven changes in individual intentions and plans. Methods of focus groups were designed to encourage a dialogue on topics proposed by the moderator. The moderator formulated each topic as broad as possible, and when differences in the respondents’ views on these questions were detected, the moderator attempted to provoke a discussion to maximum engage all participants.
The decision to remain child-free was perceived by the majority in focus groups in all regions and all types of residence as an exotic choice. Almost all respondents reported an intention to have at least one child. Two or three children were often mentioned as the ideal:
These quotations also demonstrate that childbearing was perceived by the respondents as a matter of informed choice, which can be done only when conditions for “quality” upbringing of the child are met. The respondents found this approach dominating among people of their age in their neighborhoods:
At the same time, during focus groups the opinion was frequently expressed that in different social strata different fertility ideals and different approaches to decision-making on childbearing prevail. For instance, some respondents stated that in remote rural areas people often decide to give birth “by order of nature” without properly assessing their possibilities to provide for necessary conditions for the child:
By contrast, respondents assume that families of highest wealth strata are characterized by “cautious” decisions about childbearing:
In Karachay-Cherkess Republic, the only region of the North Caucasus covered by the survey, some special views on fertility ideals were expressed. For respondents from that region, an important goal was that their children have enough siblings, so that they could get support in their adulthood:
The attitude towards early motherhood was predominantly negative among the informants. They also expressed a shared disagreement about the opinion that there exist certain age “limits” before reaching which men and women should become parents. It was often pronounced that it is exactly the present-day young generation who has abandoned these views, typical of their parents. Some respondents explained it by influence of the Western culture:
The tendency towards less “regulated” fertility behavior noted by the respondents in their generation is expressed not only in the higher variability in the age of parenthood. Some focus group participants also remarked that the earlier preference for having a child quite soon after marriage is currently becoming less common:
A shift in the first-time parenthood to older ages has gotten a number of quite rational explanations from the respondents, including the need to obtain a sufficient income level before becoming a parent; the desire to achieve certain advances in professional career before having a child; the desire to obtain some degree of “psychological maturity” before upbringing children:
The respondents acknowledged two ways in which the pandemic had influenced their fertility intentions. First, they considered medical risks generated by the pandemic as a reason to postpone childbearing:
The risk for the mother to get infected with COVID-19 at the maternity hospital was separately mentioned as a serious reason not to have children during the pandemic.
Second, the pandemic was considered a strong factor of economic uncertainty causing people to postpone childbearing. This was justified by expectations of new waves of the pandemic and views that the pandemic would have long-term economic consequences. In all regions the respondents acknowledge that among their social contacts there are couples who planned to have a child but have given up their plans because of economic risks related to possible future lockdowns:
The respondents expected the negative economic consequences of the pandemic last longer than the pandemic itself and influence fertility even after decline in the risks directly related to the virus:
It was also suggested that fertility could strongly decrease in those social groups, which were more economically affected by the pandemic than others. Owners of small enterprises were mentioned as an example:
Some respondents, predominantly in the regional centers, expected that long term consequence of the pandemic would be not only economical, but also psychological, as general level of anxiety among younger population would increase and people would expect new risks for their usual way of life. This, as the respondents stated, would affect reproductive intentions:
At the same time, some informants were confident that the pandemic would make postpone childbearing only those couples who were already hesitant about it, but those with strong intentions to have a child would not give up their plans:
In general, most respondents agreed that people in their regions were rather “exigent” in making decisions about childbearing. Many conditions are considered necessary for becoming parents. A common opinion was that this “exigence” makes the younger generation in their regions different from their parents as well as from people in some other countries:
Quite expectedly, the most important condition for childbearing concerned income level. A family income was considered secure only when both spouses have a stable employment:
Only a small number of respondents in the regional centers were ready to consider professional skills which allow for high freelance incomes as a source of financial stability comparable with a stable employment.
The respondents were rather clear about monthly income levels which they considered necessary for a one-child family (below are income levels which the participants of focus groups agreed upon after a discussion): Bashkortostan, regional center: 120-150 thousand rubles; Bashkortostan, small town: 40-50 thousand rubles; Bashkortostan, rural area: 40-70 thousand rubles; Tomsk region, regional center: from 60 (if the family does not have to rent an apartment) to 200 thousand rubles; Tomsk region, small town: 100 thousand rubles; Tomsk region, rural area: 50-80 thousand rubles; Kalmykia, regional center (Elista): 60 thousand rubles; Kalmykia, rural area: 40-60 thousand rubles; Karachay-Cherkessia, regional center (Cherkessk): from 50 (if the family does not have to rent an apartment) to 70 thousand rubles; Karachay-Cherkessia, small town/rural area: 50 thousand rubles; Astrakhan region, regional center (Astrakhan): 70-120 thousand rubles; Astrakhan region, small town/rural area: 70-80 thousand rubles. Listing these income levels, the respondents emphasize that they are not easy to achieve and mainly achievable only when both parents work.
It was also acknowledged by many respondents that their own views on income levels necessary for having a child were not shared by many other young people in their places of residence. So not only intergenerational differences, but also differences within the younger generation were viewed by the respondents:
Requirements concerning housing conditions were also quite high. They often concerned not just the size of an apartment or a house, but providing a child with his own life space from the earliest days of life:
The idea that housing conditions should in the first turn provide for psychological comfort of all family members agrees with the high general value of psychological comfort of parents acknowledged by the respondents. Remarkably, this was not at all specific to large “post-industrial” cities: for example, in rural area of Bashkortostan informants mentioned that many couples there turn to psychologists when they prepare to become first-time parents
For most respondents marriage registration before having a child was positively valued, but was considered more of a tradition rather than a necessity:
Interestingly, despite support for the “traditional” view on necessity of marriage registration, the traditional distribution of gender roles within family, treating the man as breadwinner and the women as the keeper of the household, was not popular. Female respondents, speaking about their plans to become mothers, emphasized that they found it necessary to have a sufficient level of their own income. This view, however, was mainly explained by practical considerations, such as unwillingness to be dependent upon partner’s earnings, potential instability of relations with the partner etc., rather than values of equal gender relations:
Parents or other relatives who could be of help in upbringing children were also considered as a positive, but not crucial factor for making decisions about fertility. This factor was generally higher appreciated in small towns and rural areas compared to regional centers. Some respondents, however, acknowledged that the Russian pension reform had limited the possibility for grandparents to participate in the upbringing of their grandchildren, what, in the opinion of those respondents, had a negative impact upon fertility.
Quality of kindergartens, school education, health care in their area of residence were not treated by the respondents as a factor of high importance in taking decisions about having a child. Respondents in rural areas most negatively assessed the level of medical care out there. They have related it to “optimization” of medical system which took place in Russia in the 2010th. Rural residents have mentioned insufficient number of doctors in local medical institutions, that it is impossible to have any serious medical examinations outside regional centers.
Respondents showed good knowledge of current state pronatalist measures, especially about the maternity capital and conditions under which it is granted at birth of the first and second children, about the possibility to get state subsidies for paying mortgage credits at birth of the third child, etc. Although the respondents were childless at the moment, most of them were highly interested in knowing all details about the state support which they could get if they became parents. Moreover, almost all respondents have hardly doubted that payments of the maternity capital had a stimulating effect upon fertility:
At the same time, it was acknowledged that the positive effect of the maternity capital could become weaker because of the pandemic:
Besides, same aspects of the current system of the maternity capital payments were criticized in all regions.
First, some respondents expressed the opinion that the maternity capital mainly increased fertility among most vulnerable social groups, who could hardly provide for good education and appropriate living conditions for their children even if they got this financial aid:
Second, some respondents acknowledged negative consequences of the fact that the maternity capital was most often used for paying mortgage. They were of the opinion that this resulted in a considerable increase in real estate prices:
Interestingly, this opinion was expressed by a non-economist and provoked a vivid discussion among other participants. This shows that not only the state pronatalist policy by itself, but also its economic consequences were of high interest to the respondents, despite the fact that they did not have children yet.
Third, some respondents complained that the sum of the money granted as the maternity capital allowed to purchase a house or an apartment only in areas with poor infrastructure and low living conditions. These assessments were expressed even in Kalmykia, where housing prices are generally considerably lower than in most other regions of Russia:
Finally, speaking about payments of the maternity capital after the birth of the first child, the respondents expressed the opinion that this would “accelerate” birth of the first child, but would hardly influence total fertility.
In light of these assessments, it does not come as a surprise that respondents for most part were not ready to consider receiving the maternity capital as a key factor influencing their fertility intentions:
Among other measures of state pronatalist policy, respondents were well aware of subsidies to low income families with children. These subsidies were criticized for their small size and difficulties related to their receipt:
Practical implementations of the state program “Young family” also was criticized. Within that program, subsidies for purchase of accommodation are granted to young families. Bureaucratic difficulties in getting the subsidies as well as short terms within which the purchase had to be done after getting the subsidy were mentioned as weaknesses of the program:
The focus groups have allowed to explore views on becoming parents in the time of the pandemic among residents of regional centers, small towns and rural areas in six regions of Russia. Since only childless participants aged under 35 were recruited for the focus groups, their results mainly helped analyze how the pandemic had influenced views of those people considering the possibility of becoming first-time parents.
It is important to emphasize that the method of our study (focus groups) does not provide for making any quantitative assessments of fertility in Russia or at least in the regions under study during the COVID and post-COVID era and comparing them with tendencies observed in other countries (see Section 2). However, the study made it possible to consider key approaches to reproductive decision-making used by the respondents during the pandemic.
The general approaches pursued by the respondents in relation to making decisions about having children well corresponded to the values and life priorities associated with the Second Demographic Transition, a complex of social, psychological and demographic changes started in most countries of Europe in the 1960s – 1990s (
lack of the idea that it is “obligatory” for a woman to have a certain number of children by a certain age, disagreement with the idea of “socially approved” age of motherhood;
orientation towards “high-quality” parenthood with high expenditures on children, development of maximum comfortable conditions for children including positive psychological climate in the family.
It has to be emphasized that these views were nearly equally shared by respondents from regions with different pre-pandemic fertility characteristics, by respondents from regional centers, small towns and rural areas. Respondents of these types of residence perceived this approach to parenthood as typical of their generation as opposed to the generation of their parents. This does not agree with the common opinion that the Second Demographic Transition in Russia has so far affected mainly largest cities or even only those part of their population involved in postindustrial economics. It is interesting to note that some qualitative surveys held in the 2010s have demonstrated stricter ‘norms’ for age of motherhood shared by respondents. Even interviews held in Moscow and the Moscow region with highly “modernized” family and reproductive practices, showed that respondents generally adhered to rather strict “normative” ages for the first-time parenthood (Voronova & Moiseeva 2016). At our focus groups relevance of such norms for most part was denied.
Opinions on the role of mothers and fathers in upbringing children ill-fitted in the gender equality ideals of the Second Demographic Transition. Although women who participated in the focus groups found it important to have their own sources of income during the parenthood, they explained this mainly by potential instability of their relations with the partner or by risks for the partner to lose his job, rather than adherence to gender equality principles.
It was exactly the idea of “high-quality” parenthood so typical of the Second Demographic Transition, that justified postponed childbearing in the sort-term perspective or at least a more cautious attitude towards such plans during the pandemic. Respondents saw several risks in the pandemic for such “high-quality” parenthood, the standard of which was clearly defined during the focus groups.
First of all, negative economic consequences of the pandemic for families with children were acknowledged, including risks of unemployment or, at least, inability to guarantee the income level necessary for having a child. Whatever time for the pandemic to end, respondents suggested that its economic consequences would be much longer than the pandemic itself. In these circumstances, respondents assessed their possibility to have a child counting only on their own resources: even in rural areas and even at the North Caucasus, a part of Russia usually considered as more “traditional” in terms of intergenerational relations within families, not much was said about support from elder relatives, but the necessity for both parents to have an income was emphasized instead.
Psychological consequences of the pandemic were considered important by the respondents. For them, long term consequences of the pandemic included uncertainty about the future, expectation of new events with negative consequences for family life and parenthood. Strengthening of these psychological tendencies was seen as a reason for even greater “caution” in decision-making about childbearing.
Finally, short term risks of the pandemic impact on fertility intentions were also acknowledged. These mainly included medical risks, such as the risk of getting infected in health care facilities, including children’s facilities, and COVID-19 consequences for pregnant women.
The pandemic failed to make the respondents change their “fertility ideals”, including ideal total number of children, ideal age of childbearing, etc. However, the risks mentioned above were considered as potential obstacles for achieving these ideals in the nearest future.
Finally, the respondents’ attitude towards state pronatalist policy measures was generally positive, but they did not expect these measures have a serious impact upon reproductive behavior during the pandemic. However, though being childless, the respondents demonstrated a good knowledge of various support measures for families with children and interest in implementation of such measures in their regions.
Konstantin Igorevich Kazenin – PhD (Philology), reseacher, Russian Academy for National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, 119571, Russia. Email:
* The paper reflects results of research under the state research program of Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA).