The article analyzes the results of a forecast on the socio-economic development of Chinese regions made ten years ago in a collective monograph by the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences. These results are compared with data from various countries in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita. Based on statistical data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China for 2022, it was determined that China’s GDP ranks first globally in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) and second in terms of the dollar exchange rate. More than half of China’s GDP continues to be concentrated in the coastal regions, which host the main “growth poles” of the Chinese economy: the Beijing – Tianjin – Hebei region, the Yangtze River Delta (encompassing Shanghai, northern Zhejiang, and southern Jiangsu), and the Pearl River Delta (southern Guangdong, including the Shenzhen and Zhuhai free economic zones).

According to GDP figures at the dollar exchange rate, not only Guangdong but also Jiangsu has surpassed Russia. Overall, in terms of GDP, most of China’s coastal regions have reached the level of Eastern European countries and Portugal.

Over the past decade, the gap in gross regional product (GRP) between the coastal regions and the central and western regions has significantly decreased. Most of China’s provinces now achieve GRP levels of $4-8 trillion per year (or $615-1.230 billion), surpassing the GDP figures of most countries worldwide. However, the gap between the coastal regions and the northeastern provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning) has widened. The GRP per capita in these three northeastern provinces is now lower than in the six central provinces.

To stimulate economic development in the western and central regions, as well as in the Northeast of China, the One Belt, One Road initiative was launched in 2013. This initiative aims not only to enhance the foreign economic relations of these lagging territories but also to ensure their accelerated growth by fostering new “growth poles” within these regions. The establishment of such poles is expected to drive faster development in these areas, thereby narrowing the economic gap between them and the more advanced coastal regions.

Chinese regions, gross domestic product per capita, gross regional product, coastal areas, “pole of growth”, “One Belt, One Road” initiative

The forecast for the development of Chinese regions in 2020, made approximately ten years ago, yielded mixed results. On one hand, as predicted, the rapid development of several coastal territories was achieved, and the economies of certain central and western provinces and autonomous regions largely aligned with these projections. However, the economic performance of the provinces in Northeast China and some inland provinces fell noticeably short of expectations.

In 2022, China continued to have two cities of central subordination leading in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita: Beijing (190.313 yuan) and Shanghai (179.907 yuan), equivalent to over $26.700 per person. Meanwhile, the vast majority of regions in the People’s Republic of China recorded a per capita GDP ranging from 60.000 to 180.000 yuan ($9,000-27,000) per person (China Statistical... 2023: 21, 31).

Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic rendered the 2020 data unrepresentative for several provinces, particularly Hubei in central China and some coastal regions. Consequently, data from 2022 were used to assess the accuracy of the forecasted economic development of China’s regions. When comparing Chinese statistics to global benchmarks, the choice of metrics is critical. In economic theory, the gross domestic product (GDP) is the primary measure of a country’s economy. To compare China’s GDP with other countries, it can be converted into a common currency, such as the US dollar, using two methods:

1. Exchange Rate Conversion: calculating GDP based on the official exchange rate of the yuan to the US dollar.
2. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP): comparing consumer baskets in different countries at US domestic prices to assess purchasing power equivalence.

According to the World Bank, China’s GDP at the current exchange rate for 2022 amounted to $17.7 trillion (or $12.556 per capita). In terms of purchasing power parity, it was $32 trillion (or $17.603 per capita) (World Bank 2024). For a country as large as China, the discrepancy between these two figures is relatively small. However, when comparing the cost of consumer baskets across different administrative units within China, significant discrepancies arise. It is important to note that although China is a politically unified large country, it is not unified in terms of natural, climatic, social, and economic conditions, nor in terms of business, banking, and financial interests. It is no coincidence that most foreign investments and foreign trade volumes are concentrated in China’s coastal regions, where the necessary infrastructure was already developed in the twentieth century. According to the GSU of the People’s Republic of China for 2022, the coastal regions accounted for approximately 79% of the volume of foreign trade and 75% of foreign investment (China Statistical... 2023: 16-17).

In the current conditions, significant additional work is required to recalculate the entire consumer basket for each administrative unit at US domestic prices in dollars. It should be noted that in practice, when purchasing consumer goods in Chinese stores, 10 yuan in Shanghai will buy fewer goods than in most other Chinese cities, not to mention county centers or rural stores. Therefore, in this study, to verify the results of a ten-year-old forecast, it seems logical to use the conversion rates of gross regional product (GRP) in yuan to US dollars at the current exchange rate for each administrative unit of the PRC.

In the report by CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping at the twentieth CPC Congress (October 2022), socio-economic development tasks were set for each of the four economic regions of the People’s Republic of China. For the lagging western regions, the goal was to reach a new level of socio-economic development; for the old industrial base of the Northeast, the task was to make a breakthrough; for the central regions, the aim was to promote the takeoff of economies in territories lacking competitive advantages to match the coastal regions; and for the most economically developed coastal regions, the goal was to continue modernization. Economic zones that contribute the lion’s share of GDP were also identified: the central Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei zone, the Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai, southern Jiangsu, and northern Zhejiang), and the Zhujiang River Delta in southern Guangdong Province (XX National... 2022). Specifically, the gross regional product (GRP) of the central Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei zone amounted to 10.0 trillion yuan (8.3% of China’s GDP), the Yangtze River zone (Shanghai, southern Jiangsu, and northern Zhejiang) reached 56.0 trillion yuan (46.5% of China’s GDP), and the Zhujiang River Delta zone (Guangdong Province in southern China) accounted for 29 trillion yuan (24.1% of China’s GDP). Thus, the three main economic development zones of the country together accounted for 77.9% of China’s GDP – over 75% of the total volume of the Chinese economy (GSU of the People’s Republic of China 2023: 3-4). As a result of the rapid development of these three main economic zones, three cities of central subordination – Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai – and three provinces – Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, which geographically encompass these zones, now have the best socio-economic indicators in the country, particularly in terms of GRP volume and GRP per capita.

An analysis of the results of the socio-economic development of Chinese regions allows us to assess the potential of Chinese administrative units in the future, at least until 2030, and gain a clearer understanding of the prospects for the development of the Chinese economy as a whole. In particular, the analysis of statistical indicators from the four Chinese economic regions and individual administrative units (provinces, autonomous regions, and cities of central subordination) conducted in this article provides insight into which territories are leaders and can drive the development of adjacent areas, and which are lagging behind, for which socio-economic development programs, similar to the development program for the western regions (西部大开发), should be prepared.

From 2000 to 2022, China’s economic regions developed unevenly. As shown in Table 1 below, throughout the 21st century, the coastal regions have consistently held a leading position, collectively producing more than half of the country’s total gross domestic product (GDP). The GRP indicators of all administrative units in this region have continued to grow, despite a decrease in its share of national GDP from 57.0% to 51.8% over the past 20 years. However, in absolute terms, the GRP of the region has increased 12.2 times (see Table 1).

However, during the same period, the GRP of the central region increased 13.2 times, the western region 29.7 times, and the Northeast only 6 times. As a result, the share of the central region has remained unchanged over 20 years, the share of the western regions has grown significantly and now matches that of the central region, while the share of the Northeast has decreased substantially. Of course, the rapid regional development of the People’s Republic of China was largely due to regional development programs. In particular, at the beginning of the 21st century, a program for the development of the western regions of China was introduced, followed by a program in 2005 for the restoration of the old industrial base of Northeast China, and in 2006, a program for the development of the central regions of China (Ostrovskii 2015a: 10). However, while the development programs for the western and central regions progressed relatively quickly, the Northeast developed more slowly. Specifically, over the past nine years, the region’s GRP grew by only 0.4 trillion yuan. In some years, Liaoning Province – despite having seaports and favorable conditions for economic development – experienced negative growth rates, unlike other coastal provinces where GDP grew by 7-8% annually. Notably, in 2016, Liaoning’s GRP growth was negative, declining by 2.5% (China Statistical... 2020).

At the initial stage of economic reform in China, the slogan “China has two wings: in the south – Shenzhen, in the north – Heihe” was popular. In the south, Shenzhen indeed demonstrated significant results. Shenzhen’s GDP grew from 196.38 million yuan in 1979 to 2.692.71 billion yuan in 2019, an increase of more than 13,000 times over 40 years (Aganbegyan 2023: 131). In contrast, Heihe did not emerge as a leader in either Northeast China or Heilongjiang Province. To a large extent, the Northeast of China has become a lagging region, largely because the foreign economic factor – in the form of investment and foreign economic cooperation with Russia – has not played a significant role over the past 40 years.

Table 2 is of particular interest, as it shows the dynamics of changes in GRP per capita by regions of the People’s Republic of China. In 2000, 2009, and 2013, two regions – the East and the Northeast – had a higher-than-average GRP per capita. At that time, the Northeast’s GRP per capita was higher than that of the Central region. However, by 2022, the situation had changed in several ways. Firstly, GRP per capita in the central and western regions became higher than the national average, surpassing the Northeast. Secondly, the significant gap in per capita GRP between the West and the Center, compared to the Northeast and the national average, rapidly decreased. Thirdly, the GRP per capita in the coastal provinces remained significantly higher than the national average, as well as in other territories, as shown in Table 2 below.

When compared with global indicators, it turns out that the GRP of all coastal regions, including the cities of central subordination – Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin – is slightly higher than the GDP of Japan and Germany, the third and fourth largest world economies. The GRP of the central and western regions separately – $3.8 trillion and $3.78 trillion – falls short of Germany’s GRP by $0.4 trillion but exceeds the GDP of the United Kingdom by $0.6 trillion. Meanwhile, the GRP of the Northeast, at $0.86 trillion, is comparable to that of Turkey, which has a GRP of $0.815 trillion (World Bank 2023) (see Table 1).

Over the past decade, there have been noticeable changes in GRP per capita indicators both for China as a whole and for its regions and individual administrative units (provinces, cities of central subordination, and autonomous regions). As of 2022, China’s GRP based on purchasing power parity amounted to $21.482, surpassing both the global average of $20.693 and the GRP of countries comparable to China: Colombia ($20.268), Brazil ($17.827), Georgia ($20.172), and equaling Thailand ($20.679) (World Bank 2023) (see Table 2).

The GRP per capita figures for the central region and Northeast of China are more or less in line with the global average and with GRP at the current dollar exchange rate per capita in countries such as Russia, Costa Rica, Bulgaria, and Malaysia. Meanwhile, the Primorsky region’s indicators for 2021 were slightly higher than those of Uruguay ($17.685), Croatia ($17.685), Poland ($17.841), and slightly lower than those of Slovakia ($21.392) and Latvia ($21.148). The GRP per capita figures for the western region were comparable to those of countries like Serbia ($9.230), Turkey ($9.587), Mexico ($9.926), and Brazil ($7.519) (World Bank 2023) (see Table 2).

Thus, in 2021, China significantly surpassed the planned GDP figure of 80 trillion yuan, reaching a new milestone of 100 trillion yuan. In most administrative units, it was possible to exceed the fairly ambitious projected figure of $10.000 per capita set at the XVIII CPC Congress in 2012. Moreover, China was able to surpass the global average GRP per capita of $12.263 in 10 of the 32 administrative units, with Shandong Province slightly exceeding this figure at $12.573.

It was expected that, with the continued development trends across China’s four economic regions, the gap between them would narrow. Indeed, since 2013, the gap in GRP between the Primorsky region on one hand and the central and western regions on the other has somewhat decreased. However, during this period, the GRP growth rates of the three provinces in Northeast China were notably lower not only than those of the western region but also the central region. Specifically, between 2014 and 2021, the average annual GDP growth rate in Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces was 5.7%, and in Liaoning Province, it was just 1.9%. By comparison, China’s national average was 6.0%, and most provinces and administrative regions had growth rates between 7-9% per year (China Statistical..., 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023). As a result, the gap in GRP between the Primorsky region and the Northeast widened from 6 times to 10.6 times between 2014 and 2021. In terms of per capita income, the Northeast lost its second-place position to the central region, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 above. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the average GRP per capita in both the central region and the Northeast still exceeded the national average for China. Let’s now examine the situation for each of the economic regions separately.

To stimulate the development of lagging regions, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. This initiative not only allows other countries to take loans for infrastructure projects, but also aims to integrate underdeveloped, landlocked areas of China into global economic processes through various infrastructure projects. While primarily intended to boost foreign economic relations, the Belt and Road Initiative also serves as a tool for promoting socio-economic development within China’s less-developed regions.

At the XIX Congress of the Communist Party of China (October 2017), Xi Jinping emphasized that the Belt and Road Initiative was not only about strengthening China’s external economic ties, but also about fostering the socio-economic development of various parts of the country. The initiative aimed to establish several international corridors for economic cooperation between China and foreign countries. These include:

1. A continental bridge between Asia and Europe along the ancient trade route that connected the Qin and Roman Empires.
2. A maritime route from the eastern shores of China to the southern seas, reaching the shores of East Africa.
3. International corridors for economic cooperation between China and Russia, traversing Inner Mongolia and the northeastern provinces.
4. A route through Xinjiang and the Khunjerab Pass connecting to Pakistan and Iran.
5. Corridor along the Mekong River, through the Vientiane–Kunming railway, and ports in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, facilitating trade with ASEAN countries.
6. A route through Yunnan Province extending to Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India (Ostrovskii 2020: 382-387).

To implement the Belt and Road Initiative, China plans to utilize almost its entire territory, linking individual provinces and autonomous regions with various countries through infrastructure projects. In the northwest, three provinces – Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Gansu – and two autonomous regions, Xinjiang and Ningxia, have been designated as key areas for the initiative. Among these, Xinjiang is expected to become a central hub for the Silk Road Economic Belt project. Notably, in November 2017, a cooperation agreement was signed between Urumqi and Shenzhen, with the goal of transforming Urumqi into an international trade center, modeled after Shenzhen’s success.

In Northeast China, the focus is on developing Inner Mongolia, due to its strategic location adjacent to Russia and Mongolia, as well as addressing the logistical challenges faced by the northeastern provinces. To integrate Northeast China into the Belt and Road Initiative, two key bridges were built across the Amur River: the Heihe-Blagoveshchensk automobile bridge and the Nizhneleninskoye-Tongjiang railway bridge. These projects enable the use of Russian territory as a transit zone for goods produced in the northeast, which will be transported by rail to Russian Pacific ports as part of transport projects like Vladivostok Primorye-1 and Zarubino/Primorye-2.

In Southwestern China, the Kunming-Vientiane railway has been completed, which, along with the route along the Mekong River, will greatly enhance regional development. As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, China aims to leverage its trade advantages with ASEAN countries, accelerate the development of the Gulf of Tonkin region, and expand key ports in Guangxi. The initiative will also focus on enhancing border crossings with Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar in Yunnan Province.

In the coastal regions of China, special emphasis will be placed on Fujian Province and its capital, Fuzhou, as critical transport hubs for the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century. This initiative will accelerate the economic growth of Fujian by enhancing its role in international trade and logistics. Additionally, Hainan Province has seen significant development in recent years, fueled by local regulations aimed at attracting foreign investment. In 2021 alone, Hainan received $45.27 billion in foreign investment, which accounted for about a quarter of all foreign investments in China that year (China Statistical... 2022). Meanwhile, Hebei Province, which has lagged behind other coastal regions, has been the focus of a new growth strategy. The Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei growth zone is now home to a rapidly developing Xiong’an Free Economic Zone, modeled after Shenzhen. This initiative aims to establish a new administrative center and create a “development pole” that will drive growth not only in Hebei but also in the neighboring northern provinces of Shandong and Shanxi.

In the interior of China, economic growth will be supported by the development of key cities along the middle Yangtze River in Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi provinces, as well as in the Chengdu–Chongqing zone in Sichuan Province. These cities will serve as hubs for the creation of infrastructure clusters, which will help drive the regional economy forward. A key component of this development will be the Chongqing-Duisburg Eurasian Railway corridor, which will pass through Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. This corridor, along with the coordination of customs posts and the China-Europe container train, will facilitate the flow of goods between China and Europe, strengthening economic ties across the region.

As we can see, the Belt and Road Initiative is not only designed to enhance China’s foreign economic relations but will also play a pivotal role in the rapid development of various provinces, administrative districts, and cities, including those that are distant from seaports. The initiative will significantly boost the GRP (Gross Regional Product) of these regions, promoting balanced economic growth across the country.

Currently, China has three major “growth poles”: 1) the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region (京津冀); 2) the Pearl River Delta (south of Guangdong Province); and 3) the Yangtze River Delta (including Shanghai, northern Zhejiang, and southern Jiangsu). These regions ensure the economic success of three centrally administered cities – Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin – and three provinces: Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. The new “growth poles” created as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative will establish new zones of rapid economic development and contribute to a significant increase in both total GDP and per capita GDP. This will support the “dual circulation” (双循环) strategy of the Chinese economy, which aims to position China as a global leader by the middle of the 21st century.

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Ostrovskii Andrei Vladimirovich – Doctor of Economics, Full Professor. Centre of Contemporary China Studies. Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. / Moscow, 107031, Russia. E-mail: ostrovskii.ifes@gmail.gmail.com