Corresponding author: Seung Hyun Seo ( jesvic@mail.ru ) © 2019 Seung Hyun Seo.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Citation:
Seo SH (2019) Low fertility trend in the Republic of Korea and the problems of its family and demographic policy implementation. Population and Economics 3(2): 29-35. https://doi.org/10.3897/popecon.3.e37938
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The article analyzes the population trends and the family and demographic policy in the contemporary Republic of Korea. The main emphasis is made on the analysis of low birth rate in the country. Until the end of the 20th century, the two-child family model prevailed in South Korea, however, in the last decade birth and marriage rates have become among the lowest in the world. Why has fertility fallen so dramatically far below replacement level? The article discusses the causes of fertility decline, as well as the social factors that contribute to and hinder the implementation of state measures to stimulate and increase the birth rate in the Republic of Korea. In particular, the social and gender aspects of solving the problem of low fertility are analyzed.
low birth rate, marriage, family and demographic policy, family culture, gender
In the Republic of Korea, an increasing number of young people decide not to marry. This social phenomenon is widespread in the society, and for these people there is even a special term “Sampo generation.” A similar phenomenon is observed in Japan — the emergence of the “Satori generation”, who practice giving up many values that are important to the generation of their parents, including sex, marriage and children. South Korea now uses the term “Nipo generation” for young people with the same lifestyle. This means that the younger generation constantly declines hope for a better future, not only in relation to marriage and family, but also in other areas of life.
In the past 10 years, the Republic of Korea has recorded some of the lowest fertility and marriage levels in the world. In 2018, the total fertility rate in South Korea fell below one for the first time – to 0.98 (in 2017 it was 1.05, i.e. the decline was by 7.1%). According to UN forecasts, by 2021 it will decrease to 0.86, and after 2029 the country’s population may begin to decline (
Since 2006, the Korean Government has invested heavily in population and family policies to increase birth rate. But most experts argue that the measures taken have not yielded results, as the birth rate continues to decline. Consequently, the low fertility and the possibilities of increasing it by means of family and demographic policies becomes a burning issue (
The article discusses some features of the demographic situation and causes of low fertility in the Republic of Korea and also, analyzes the social factors that contribute to and hinder the implementation of government measures to stimulate birth rate growth. The gender aspect of solving the problem of low fertility is addressed. Based on the analysis, the new approaches and measures of family and social policy in the area of fertility are proposed. In accordance with the purpose of the research, the article uses theoretical methods of research, namely secondary analysis of Korean sources and Korean research literature, analysis of government documents, official Korean statistics (KOSTAT) and sample surveys of the population of the Republic of Korea.
One of the most visible characteristics in the demographic situation of recent decades is unprecedented decline in fertility. By the beginning of the 21st century, academic and social discourse included the term “very low fertility”, i.e. a situation where the total fertility rate (TFR) falls below 1.3, which is typical for East Asian countries. In the early 2010s, TFR was 1.21 in Japan, 1.23 in the Republic of Korea (Fig.
Number of births and total fertility rate in the Republic of Korea, 2006-2017. Source: KOSTAT, Birth Statistics 2017, № 10103. http://kostat.go.kr/wnsearch/search.jsp
Projected share of population over 65 years of age in East Asia (%)
2000 | 2020 | 2050 | |
Japan | 17.2 | 28.5 | 37.8 |
South Korea | 7.2 | 15.6 | 38.2 |
Thailand | 8.6 | 16.2 | 35.9 |
Singapore | 7.2 | 17.9 | 32.6 |
In addition, under a patriarchal family culture prevailing in Korean society, the birth of a child may not normally occur out of a formal (registered) marriage. In South Korea, only 1.9 per cent of births are out of wedlock, it is the lowest rate among OECD countries. In Japan, which also has almost no extramarital births, this figure is 2.3 per cent These rates are incomparable to the European Union countries where 42.6 per cent of the total number of births are born out of wedlock (
In accordance with this marriage trend, the age of birth of the first child also increased. According to statistics for 2018, the age of birth of the first child was 31.9 years, the second child – 33.6 years, the third child – 35.1 years. At the same time, the number of young people who give up marriages and child births, even in legal marriage, increases. A special term DINK — Double Income and No Kids, appeared. In South Korea, traditionally known for large families, the emergence of childless marriages reflects deep transformations in the society, and many young people do not have intention to have children in their lifetime (
Modern Korean society is moving towards individualism, and this affects family values and the daily lives of the population: in 2017, the share of single-person households in Korean society rose to 28.7% (
Why do young people give up the idea to get children in East Asia in general and in the Republic of Korea in particular? South Korea has the lowest birth rate in the world, and if the situation does not change, the nation may be on the verge of extinction (
Firstly, in modern Korean society, fertility is increasingly declining with rising women’s overall education and employment, with an increase in the number of unmarried women. Modern Korean women want to live independently and put their dreams into reality; they are afraid to combine family and work, fear loss of independence and disruption of plans.
Secondly, after the financial crisis in South Korea in 1997 and in connection with the liberalization of the market on a global scale, the labour market in the country became very competitive, and young people should put in a lot of effort to reach a position at work. However, in Korea, compared to other developed countries of the world, the social security system does not sufficiently correspond to such conditions, despite rapid growth of the economy. It was a turning point from which the demographic situation in the country began to change dramatically. Therefore, young people either postpone marriage and, consequently, the birth of a child for the sake of their career, or do not plan to marry and have children at all in order not to lose their jobs. The marriage rate constantly reduces: in 2018, the marriage rate was 5 ‰, whereas in 2009 it was 6.2 ‰, in 1970 it was 9.2 ‰ (
Thirdly, an important factor influencing the choice between giving or giving up childbirth is the fear of becoming a victim of child care and upbringing. In Korea, parents must spend their money on raising their children and education, including additional classes, on private education. Although public education is free, the competitive environment in schools forces parents to pay for additional education. It is a very common socio-cultural phenomenon in Korea, related to the negative side of academic sectarianism based on the traditional idea of “Korean Confucianism.”
Fourthly, an authoritarian patriarchal family culture is an important factor that has influenced the very low (by WHO criteria) birth rate and makes it difficult to solve the problem of low fertility in East Asian countries, including South Korea. According to social surveys, most girls say that they do not want to experience the pain associated with childbirth; moreover, having a child would harm their careers. The Republic of Korea has labour laws prohibiting discrimination against pregnant women, but trade unions say that these laws are often ignored. Quite often pregnant women worry about their future. In many cases, even if a woman is employed, the care for children falls almost entirely on her (
According to the Japanese researcher T. Suzuki, in East Asia, where the TFR is less than 1.5, the situation is as follows: the gender-role stereotypes in the family and at enterprise encourage low fertility; children start to earn their own money at relatively late age; the mother is more responsible for caring for children; very few children are born out of registered marriage (
“The 2018 National Survey on Fertility and Family Health and Welfare” conducted by the Korean Institute of Health and Social Affairs presented the results of a survey of never-married men and women aged 20-44 years. 28.9% of men and 48.0% of women said that it was not necessary to have a child; the proportion of women and men who did not plan to have children doubled as compared to a similar survey for 2015 (
In 1970, Korea’s TFR was 4.53, a very high level compared to other OECD countries; by 1983 it had more than halved, to 2.06, and in 1990 it was already 1.59. In 2017, South Korea’s TFR fell to 1.05, the lowest level among all OECD countries (the OECD average is 1.7, and 11 countries registered a TFR below 1.5) (
The fall in birth rate is acknowledged a serious challenge for South Korea. Accordingly, a new law was adopted in 2005 to support fertility and mitigate the negative effects of population ageing. From 2006 to 2020, five-year basic plans for increasing fertility and slowing the ageing of society have been established. Over the past decade, the Government has spent a huge amount of about 80 trillion Won (USD 71 billion) for these purposes (
What is the problem of family and demographic policy in Korea? Many experts say that first of all a change of policy paradigms is necessary (
Accordingly, the Third Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aged Society (2016-2020) is aimed at achieving a new quality of life for all generations and supporting not only officially marries couples, but families and households of different types. The plan includes the concept of gender equality so that young people who delay marriage and childbirth or completely abandon it can effectively combine work and family. It is necessary to revisit the working regime, wage structure (reduce income inequality), maternity leave, housing problems for young families, etc. (
The South Korea’s social policy failed to adequately address gender inequalities in the family and at work, and the need to give people confidence in the future. Therefore, when elaborating social policy in the field of fertility, it is necessary to take into consideration the patriarchal structure of the social system and the social regimes that affect the socio-cultural environment.
Many experts point out the high cost of raising children, the double burden of performing basic household and childcare duties for working mothers as reasons for the decline in marriage and birth rates. Others believe that the key factors are the competitive society of South Korea, including its rigid education system and the labour market. In our opinion, the family and demographic policies must combine elimination of the factors that make people give up marriage and childbirth and respect of fundamental rights and freedoms of people with a view to overcoming socio-economic inequalities.
Seung Hyun Seo, Ph.D. in Sociology, Professor at the Sogang University (Seoul) and the Institute of Sociology of the Daegu Catholic University, Republic of Korea. E-mail: jesvic@mail.ru