The paper discusses results of a qualitative study conducted in May-June 2021 in six regions of Russia (Astrakhan region, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Kalmykia, Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, Tomsk region and Yaroslavl region) with the purpose to identify opinions on impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on fertility. Focus groups were held in these regions among childless respondents aged below 35. This allowed to observe influence of the pandemic on intentions to become first-time parents which is critically important for fertility tendencies. Although the survey regions differed considerably by fertility rate and age-specific characteristics as well as by socio-cultural characteristics, key results of the focus groups were rather similar across regions. The respondents in all regions very strictly defined income levels necessary for having a child and also stressed out the need for parents to provide positive psychological conditions for their young off-springs. Assessing their abilities to become “high-quality” parents, the informants relied almost only on their own resources, not counting much upon assistance of elder relatives. Under these views, the pandemic was perceived as a serious obstacle for the “high-quality” parenthood. The informants did not expect the state measures of support for families with children to considerably soften this effect of the pandemic.

fertility, fertility intentions, COVID-19, Russia

The general problem the paper discusses is the influence of the COVID pandemic upon fertility. Many studies suggest this influence in Russia and other countries, however its real scale and nature are currently yet to be discovered (see Section 2 for a brief overview of existing studies). Analysis of possible changes in fertility trends in the context of the COVID pandemic is of special interest because COVID-19 is the first global pandemic after dramatic fertility changes in the world in the 20^th century (for example, Vishnevsky 2015: 7-91), resulting in a serious decrease in birth rates and a widespread of family planning methods. Earlier pandemics of comparable scales took place long before those fertility transformations and, as available data show, were followed by only short-term, yet rather steep decline (Siddharth & Yu 2015). Is the impact of the pandemic similar now, when childbearing became much more planned and ‘conscious’ than it used to be?

For Russia, official country-level statistics did not indicate any serious effect of the pandemic upon total fertility so far. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) remained stable at the levels of 1.49-1.50 children per woman in Russia in 2020-2021 with the decline to this level initiated and gradually progressing in previous years (for example, Kazenin 2022). However, these figures in no way allow to state that the influence of the pandemic was insignificant and should not be studied. First of all, studies conducted in several countries show that the pandemic so far has more affected fertility intentions, ideals and approaches to family planning rather than actual fertility (see Section 2). These potential consequences of the pandemic in Russia should be investigated, because changes of this kind are often long-standing and tend to persist and affect actual fertility even when their initial trigger becomes irrelevant. Besides, it is well known that regions of Russia differ considerably in reproductive behavior of their population. That is why impacts of the pandemic have to be studied at the regional level, too. For preliminary assessments of effects of the pandemic on fertility and, more generally, on family practices in Russia see (Isupova 2020b; Kalabikhina 2020). The present paper attempts to analyze influence of the pandemic upon reproductive intentions of population in several Russian regions which differed in fertility characteristics before the pandemic. The study used the method of focus groups. The analysis is based on data from a qualitative survey conducted in six Russian regions in May-June 2021. Respondents included men and women aged under 35, who claimed neither to have any children nor expect a child at the time of the survey recruitment.

Section 1 of the paper outlines possible effects of the pandemic upon fertility which are expected within the framework of the current demographic theory. Section 2 summarizes available data on changes in actual fertility and fertility intentions during the pandemic in different countries. Section 3 formulates the study objectives, while Section 4 outlines the study method. Section 5 presents main results, while Section 6 provides for their discussion.

Existing studies allow to distinguish at least two possible reasons for postponed childbearing or refusal of earlier plans to have a child during the pandemic.

First, in many studies it is argued that “external shocks” which have changed life conditions of individuals and households within a short time were regularly followed by decreased fertility. This was also observed at those historical stages when family planning methods were already commonly used and, therefore, decline in fertility was mainly induced by giving up fertility intentions. Among epidemiological “external shocks” which have had a negative impact upon fertility, the outburst of the Zika virus in Brazil in 2015 can be an illustration (Marteleto et al. 2020). The crisis of 2008-2009, followed by fertility decrease in the developed countries, can be an example of an economical “external shock” (Sobotka et al. 2011). Noteworthy, consequences of these “external shocks” for fertility in one and the same country could be different across social groups. For example, at the time of the Zika virus outburst in Brazil fertility decrease was especially serious among least educated populations. The economic crisis in the late 2000^th resulted in stronger relationship between birth probability and family financial status in European countries (Matysiak et al. 2021), i.e. “response” to the crises was different across groups with different economic situation.

Second, it has been demonstrated many times that economic uncertainty can be a factor decreasing fertility. According to majority of studies on fertility, labor market instability and high risks of unemployment are most often considered as the primary components of this uncertainty (for example, Comolli & Vignoli 2021; Gozgor et al. 2021). Obviously, uncertainty of this kind can be caused by other things rather than only “external shocks” of the epidemiological or economic type, however such “shocks” can increase economic uncertainty affecting fertility. An important result of studies on the relation between economic uncertainty and fertility is that reproductive intentions can be affected by both uncertainty directly associated with economic experience of a family, and a feeling of uncertainty prevailing in the family’s social network (Yu & Sun 2018).

Data on changes in fertility intentions and actual fertility in different countries during the pandemic are still rather fragmentary and preliminary. Without claiming to be a comprehensive review of available studies, we will present here only some results showing, on the one hand, the scale of the pandemic impact on fertility, and on the other hand, a rather complex, «nonlinear» nature of this influence. In most European countries and North America, the first wave of the pandemic (spring 2020) was followed by a serious decline in fertility manifested in the decreased number of births in November-December 2020 and January 2021 compared to the same months of the previous year (Sobotka et al. 2021). Specifically, in 13 countries of the European Union (UN) for which data were available by the end of 2021 (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Finland, France) the overall decrease in the number of births added up to 4.7% in November 2020, 6.4% in December 2020 and 9% in January 2021. However, this decrease by no means corresponded to the previous trends in most of these countries, even in the countries with fertility decreasing before the pandemic yet in low gear. However, the first wave “shock” did not last long: already in March 2021 the overall number of births in these countries was 4.1% higher than in March 2020, and until summer 2021 deviations from the birth numbers in the previous year were within 2%. Similar dynamics was observed in the U.S. However, in countries closer to the initial epicenter of COVID19 - Japan and South Korea, the first wave “shock” was more significant and was not followed by a quick recovery of fertility levels. In those countries the number of births decreased by about 15% by the end of 2020 compared to the similar month of 2019 with negative dynamics dominating almost throughout 2021 (Seredkina 2022).

Available studies on fertility intentions during the pandemic also focus on changes in intentions mainly during the first wave. Surveys and social network analyses have identified a strong tendency towards postponed births in countries with different levels of economic development and different socio-cultural characteristic, including some countries in Western and Southern Europe (Luppi et al. 2020), the U.S. (Lindberg et al. 2020), China (Zhu et al. 2020), and Moldova (Emery & Koops 2022). Most studies were mainly focused on impact of the pandemic on short-term fertility intentions (within a year). Results on the above-mentioned countries also showed that changes in fertility intentions during the pandemic could be different across different population groups. At least for some of these countries, a higher probability of earlier intentions to have a baby being postponed have been identified in the following groups of respondents:

• those facing especially hard financial consequences of the pandemic or having especially negative expectations about its consequences;
• least-educated respondents (who could feel themselves especially vulnerable during the pandemic);
• women of earlier reproductive age (aged under 30; this age group may have higher chances to fulfill their earlier fertility intentions in the future); and
• those with a negative opinion about anti-COVID policy in their country.

Given the theoretical expectations and results of available studies on fertility intentions during the COVID-19 pandemic in other countries, the study aimed at covering the following questions in the context of Russia:

• Is the pandemic an important factor for decision-making about childbearing? What is exactly the impact as viewed by potential parents?
• What other factors are most crucial for respondents in terms of decision-making about childbearing during the pandemic?
• Do respondents consider state policy measures on household support during the pandemic and pronatalist policy measures important for making decisions about childbearing?

We have attempted to answer these questions regarding childless men and women aged under 35. Focus on this age group was substantiated by the current age structure of fertility in Russia. Despite serious changes within the recent decades, the share of children born to mothers and fathers aged under 35 is still dominant, making reproductive intentions in these age groups crucial for fertility trends.

The fact that the survey is limited to childless respondents only was due to the following reasons. On the one hand, in general terms, it is natural to assume that becoming first-time parents suggests significant changes in the life of a couple, often more serious than birth of a subsequent child. Therefore, it can be expected that consequences of the pandemic for the first-child intentions could be especially serious. On the other hand, the mentioned about study on fertility intentions in Western and Southern Europe in the first months of the pandemic (Luppi et al. 2020) demonstrated that respondents who had already had at least one child by the time of the pandemic were more likely to refuse their earlier plans for childbearing. A possible explanation of this tendency is that for childless couples, especially in late reproductive ages, the postponement of childbearing was fraught with serious risks of remaining childless. It should be noted here that in Russia, with its ultimate childlessness level lower that in most countries of Western and Southern Europe, this factor could be even stronger. All in all, childless informants gave a chance to observe the potentially multidirectional effects of the pandemic on first-child intentions.

The focus group method proved to be prospective for studies on life strategies and plans of younger generations in Russia (see (Isupova 2020a) for up-to-date use of the method in studies on the Russian youth). This method allows to observe variety of approaches used by the respondents to plan their future and factors they rely upon in planning. Admittedly, focus groups give less opportunities to study ‘deeper’, intimate aspects of the development of childbearing intentions than individual in-depth interviews. Unavoidable cultural constraints although present in varying degree in different regions selected for the study, made it difficult to discuss such aspects in the format of a collective conversation. However, the focus groups allowed to observe variety of opinions on factors outside the respondents’ intimate personal life which they considered important for their reproductive plans. The pandemic here was on a par with socio-economic conditions in the neighborhood and in the region where respondents live, state social policy towards younger generations, situation in healthcare and social protection, etc.

The focus group discussions were held according to one and the same guidelines in six regions of Russia in May-June 2021. In each region one focus group was held at the regional center and one or two interviews in a small town or rural area. Focus groups were held separately in regional centers in all regions. If only one focus group was held outside the regional center, it included both respondents residing in small town and rural area. In this case the rural or urban residence of each participant in the dialogue was identified. Most rural respondents came from relatively big settlements (with at least 1000 of population). This allowed to expect relatively small differences in their living conditions and that of respondents from small towns.

From 8 to 14 respondents took part in each focus group. Overall, 14 focus groups were held, the total number of participants equaled to 127. Men/women ratio, as well as proportions of respondents aged 18-24, 25-29 and 30-34 were nearly equal in most of the focus groups. Marital status was not controlled at the recruitment. In each group, the resulting proportion of married respondents or in civil union was not lower than 70%. Respondents with higher education accounted for up to 40% of participants in each focus-group. Ethnic composition of respondents correlated with ethnic composition of population at the territories where the survey was held.

We attempted to avoid recruiting respondents who had been acquainted with each other before the focus group. This was feasible in regional centers, while could be more problematic in small towns and rural areas. Spouses or partners never participated together in focus groups.

The following regions were selected for the survey: Astrakhan region, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Kalmykia, Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, Tomsk region, and Yaroslavl region. The selection was guided by the attempts to include region of the Russian Federation that considerably differed in first-birth levels and age characteristics. For example, the Astrakhan region was interesting as the one with the first-child Total Fertility Rate (TFR1) higher than the Russian average in 2020, with mother’s mean age at first birth (MAB1) lower than the country average (see Table 1). In the Tomsk region, TFR1 was lower and MAB1 higher than the Russian average. In the Republic of Bashkortostan both of these parameters were quite close to the country levels. The Yaroslavl regions was an example of a region where TFR1 in 2020 was close to the country level, while MAB1 was lower than the Russian average. Karachay-Cherkess Republic was included in the survey as a region where MAB1 was close to, but TFR1 considerably lower than the country levels in 2020. Finally, the Republic of Kalmykia was considered as a region with one of the lowest TFR1 in 2020 compared to most other regions of Russia, withMAB1 lower than the Russian average.

Thus, the regions selected for the study are diverse in terms of their first-child birth rates in previous years (see Table 1).

It has to be emphasized here that our comparative cross-regional study did not aim to be representative for the country as a whole in any sense, rather than only documented similarities and differences in respondents’ opinions in the selected regions.

It should be noted here that selection of particular regions for the survey among regions with similar fertility characteristics was guided by feasibility of conducting the survey in different regions rather than any formal procedure. Furthermore, it was hardly possible to take into account interregional differences in characteristics of the pandemic when selecting the regions, due to problems with data on COVID mortality in the Russian regions (Kobak 2021). It is interesting in this connection that almost no differences in assessments of the COVID-associated health risks were detected among respondents from different regions and types of settlement.

The focus-group guidelines included questions not only on the pandemic and fertility plans/intentions before and during it, but also general views on parenthood, ideal number of children etc.

It was generally not possible to discuss if and how these general views changed during the pandemic: respondents were more inclined to discuss their current perception of “high-quality” family life and parenthood regardless of time as well as pandemic-driven changes in individual intentions and plans. Methods of focus groups were designed to encourage a dialogue on topics proposed by the moderator. The moderator formulated each topic as broad as possible, and when differences in the respondents’ views on these questions were detected, the moderator attempted to provoke a discussion to maximum engage all participants.

The focus groups have allowed to explore views on becoming parents in the time of the pandemic among residents of regional centers, small towns and rural areas in six regions of Russia. Since only childless participants aged under 35 were recruited for the focus groups, their results mainly helped analyze how the pandemic had influenced views of those people considering the possibility of becoming first-time parents.

It is important to emphasize that the method of our study (focus groups) does not provide for making any quantitative assessments of fertility in Russia or at least in the regions under study during the COVID and post-COVID era and comparing them with tendencies observed in other countries (see Section 2). However, the study made it possible to consider key approaches to reproductive decision-making used by the respondents during the pandemic.

The general approaches pursued by the respondents in relation to making decisions about having children well corresponded to the values and life priorities associated with the Second Demographic Transition, a complex of social, psychological and demographic changes started in most countries of Europe in the 1960s – 1990s (Sobotka 2008). The following views shared during the focus groups are especially typical of societies with the completed or almost completed Second Demographic Transition:

• lack of the idea that it is “obligatory” for a woman to have a certain number of children by a certain age, disagreement with the idea of “socially approved” age of motherhood;
• orientation towards “high-quality” parenthood with high expenditures on children, development of maximum comfortable conditions for children including positive psychological climate in the family.

It has to be emphasized that these views were nearly equally shared by respondents from regions with different pre-pandemic fertility characteristics, by respondents from regional centers, small towns and rural areas. Respondents of these types of residence perceived this approach to parenthood as typical of their generation as opposed to the generation of their parents. This does not agree with the common opinion that the Second Demographic Transition in Russia has so far affected mainly largest cities or even only those part of their population involved in postindustrial economics. It is interesting to note that some qualitative surveys held in the 2010s have demonstrated stricter ‘norms’ for age of motherhood shared by respondents. Even interviews held in Moscow and the Moscow region with highly “modernized” family and reproductive practices, showed that respondents generally adhered to rather strict “normative” ages for the first-time parenthood (Voronova & Moiseeva 2016). At our focus groups relevance of such norms for most part was denied.

Opinions on the role of mothers and fathers in upbringing children ill-fitted in the gender equality ideals of the Second Demographic Transition. Although women who participated in the focus groups found it important to have their own sources of income during the parenthood, they explained this mainly by potential instability of their relations with the partner or by risks for the partner to lose his job, rather than adherence to gender equality principles.

It was exactly the idea of “high-quality” parenthood so typical of the Second Demographic Transition, that justified postponed childbearing in the sort-term perspective or at least a more cautious attitude towards such plans during the pandemic. Respondents saw several risks in the pandemic for such “high-quality” parenthood, the standard of which was clearly defined during the focus groups.

First of all, negative economic consequences of the pandemic for families with children were acknowledged, including risks of unemployment or, at least, inability to guarantee the income level necessary for having a child. Whatever time for the pandemic to end, respondents suggested that its economic consequences would be much longer than the pandemic itself. In these circumstances, respondents assessed their possibility to have a child counting only on their own resources: even in rural areas and even at the North Caucasus, a part of Russia usually considered as more “traditional” in terms of intergenerational relations within families, not much was said about support from elder relatives, but the necessity for both parents to have an income was emphasized instead.

Psychological consequences of the pandemic were considered important by the respondents. For them, long term consequences of the pandemic included uncertainty about the future, expectation of new events with negative consequences for family life and parenthood. Strengthening of these psychological tendencies was seen as a reason for even greater “caution” in decision-making about childbearing.

Finally, short term risks of the pandemic impact on fertility intentions were also acknowledged. These mainly included medical risks, such as the risk of getting infected in health care facilities, including children’s facilities, and COVID-19 consequences for pregnant women.

The pandemic failed to make the respondents change their “fertility ideals”, including ideal total number of children, ideal age of childbearing, etc. However, the risks mentioned above were considered as potential obstacles for achieving these ideals in the nearest future.

Finally, the respondents’ attitude towards state pronatalist policy measures was generally positive, but they did not expect these measures have a serious impact upon reproductive behavior during the pandemic. However, though being childless, the respondents demonstrated a good knowledge of various support measures for families with children and interest in implementation of such measures in their regions.

Konstantin Igorevich Kazenin – PhD (Philology), reseacher, Russian Academy for National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, 119571, Russia. Email: kz@ranepa.ru